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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the literature on corporate groups in Japan and elsewhere, and offers a
comparison of Japan's corporate groups with groups in other developed and developing countries.
It then proceeds to examine the evolution of corporate groups in Japan since the mid-1970s. The
main conclusions that emerge are that: 1. Empirical evidence on the economic roles of corporate
groups in Japan is limited. 2. Japanese groups are, in some respects, quite similar to groups in other
countries, but their risk and return characteristics differ substantially. 3. There is little to suggest that
over the past thirty years groups have had a major impact on Japan's industrial structure. In view of
these findings, and because there is no evidence that Japanese groups (unlike those in some other
countries) enjoy any particular political clout, it is unlikely that corporate groups will constitute an
impediment to structural change in Japan.
Yishay Yafeh










yishay.yafeh@umontreal.caAcademic and popular views of the keiretsu, as postwar Japanese corporate groups are 
sometimes called, range from complete dismissal to admiration of their influence, 
whether it is alleged to enhance economic growth or to restrict entry into the Japanese 
market. During the 1990s, cross-shareholding arrangements within groups, and ties 
between ailing financial institutions and their client firms, have often been mentioned as 
potential impediments to structural change, especially with respect to the introduction of 
market-based means of corporate finance and governance.  
  The present paper has three objectives. The first is to review the literature on 
corporate groups in Japan and elsewhere, summarizing the evidence on the economic 
roles (if any) corporate groups have played in the Japanese economy. The second 
objective is to present, for the first time, a comparison of Japanese groups and corporate 
groups in other developed and developing countries. The main conclusion emerging 
from this comparison is that Japanese groups, while similar to groups elsewhere in some 
respects, are different in their risk and return characteristics. The third objective is to 
describe the evolution of Japan’s groups since the mid-1970s and to examine whether or 
not groups constitute an impediment to structural change in Japan. 
  With some exceptions, there is limited evidence of the economic importance of 
corporate groups in postwar Japan. There is also little to suggest that groups have had a 
major impact on growth rates of particular industries, and no evidence that Japanese 
groups (unlike those in other countries) enjoy any particular political clout. It is 
therefore unlikely that corporate groups will constitute an impediment to structural 
change. 
  Powerful, family controlled, pyramidal groups (zaibatsu) existed in Japan from 
the late 19th century to just after World War II. Our focus here, however, is on corporate 
groups in postwar Japan. These are usually divided into two types. The first consist of 
firms operating in many industries, with large financial institutions (a city bank, a trust 
bank, and insurance companies) at the core. These are variously termed horizontal, 
financial, or bank-centered groups. There are six major groups of this type, three with 
zaibatsu roots. 
  The second type consists of a large manufacturer and related suppliers within the 
same industry or in closely related sectors. These are often described as vertical or 
manufacturer-centered groups. Examples include Toyota or Hitachi. 
  The discussion here focuses mostly on bank-centered groups. First I review the 
literature on corporate groups in general, and then evaluate the empirical evidence on 
the economic importance of Japan’s corporate groups. I then make a cross-sectional 
comparison between Japanese corporate groups and those in other countries, and 
describe the evolution of groups in Japan over time, including their prospects.  
 
1.  Identifying Corporate Groups 
 
The criteria used to define the boundaries of a group and to identify members vary 
considerably across countries and studies (Khanna 2000). In most countries, including 
Japan, membership is typically informal. (Exceptions include Italy, where the law 
identifies “common control” (see Bianchi et al. 2001) and Chile, where groups are legal 
entities.)  
  Still, the literature has struggled to provide a definition - or at least definitions 
for each country. Leff (1978, p 673) put forward “a group of companies that does 
business in different markets under a common administrative or financial control,” but 
this is clearly inappropriate in postwar Japan, where groups lack common control. 
Strachan (1976) defines a group as a long-term association of firms and the people who 
own and manage them, and points out that a group cannot be identified purely on the 
basis of a single metric. The criteria used to identify membership in Japanese groups 
have mostly been based on measures of long-term relations among member firms. 
 
1.1 Origins of Japanese Groups 
The prewar and war-time economy of Japan was dominated by large, diversified 
conglomerates (zaibatsu). At war’s end the four major zaibatsu represented about a 
quarter of paid-in capital and a much larger shares in finance and heavy industries 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2001, p 69 Box 3.5, and Hadley 1970). The zaibatsu were family-
owned conglomerates, controlled through holding companies which in turn held a large 
number of shares in a first tier of subsidiaries. First-tier subsidiaries controlled a second 
tier of companies, and so forth, forming a pyramid of firms. Horizontal ownership and 
personnel ties between group firms were also common.
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  Following Japan’s defeat in 1945, the US occupation authorities (Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers = SCAP) regarded the zaibatsu as an important part 
of the Japanese social and economic structure that was responsible for the war. In 
particular, the market power of the zaibatsu and the tremendous wealth of the founding 
families made the dissolution of the conglomerates one of the first and most important 
targets of the Occupation reforms. 
                                                             
1 Okazaki (2001) argues that the zaibatsu were not powerful enough to “dominate” the Japanese economy 
before the start of World War II, but during the war they increased market power and played an important 
role in providing military equipment and supplies to the Japanese Imperial Army.  The  zaibatsu dissolution reforms started soon after the end of the war and ended 
around 1950. The holding companies were dismantled and new ones prohibited by law, 
the founding families were stripped of their shares, and many of the incumbent 
managers were purged and barred from corporate office. The resulting change of 
ownership was of enormous scale: some estimates suggest that over 40% of all 
corporate assets in Japan changed hands (Bisson 1954). The shares transferred were 
resold by the Holding Companies Liquidation Commission (HCLC) using several 
methods designed to guarantee disperse ownership structure (see Hadley 1970, p 181-
87). Indeed, following the conclusion of the reforms, shareholding by individuals in 
Japan reached an all time high of approximately 70% around 1949 (Aoki 1988). 
  Despite the hopes of the Occupation, the newly created ownership structure 
proved unstable. With the reopening of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1949, individuals 
who received shares during the reforms (especially company employees and residents of 
cities where the companies operated) began to sell, and individual shareholding began 
to decline.  By the early 1950s a new ownership structure had emerged: most companies 
were owned by other companies and by financial institutions, most notably large 
commercial banks (“city banks”). 
  Ownership ties were sometimes part of reciprocal cross-shareholdings, often 
along the lines of the former zaibatsu - especially among what had been the three 
largest: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo (see Hoshi 1994, Yafeh 1995). These ties 
were further reinforced in the late 1960s, and “new” groups centered on major (city) 
banks were formed (Dai-Ichi Bank and Nippon Kangyo Bank, which later merged to 
form the DKB group, Fuji, and Sanwa).  
  There are several possible reasons why the period of dispersed ownership was so 
short. Individuals may have been too poor and too risk averse to wish to hold equity, 
and preferred to increase their consumption or save in the form of bank accounts rather 
than hold shares. 
  Another reason asserted by many authors (for example, Miyajima 1994) is that 
the reformed firms were exposed to hostile takeovers once their zaibatsu shareholders 
were removed. Low equity prices soon after the war are posited to have made Japanese 
firms easy targets. In order to prevent this, managers sought to establish a friendly, 
stable ownership structure dominated by firms associated with each other in the prewar 
period. However, it is not clear who the potential raiders could have been. 
  An alternative explanation for the short life of extensive individual ownership is 
simply that it was inefficient. Yafeh (1995) shows that, other things equal, the greater 
the percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares expropriated and resold by the Occupation, 
the worse was the firm’s performance in the early 1950s. This is consistent with the view that large shareholders play an important role in corporate governance (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986). Concentrated family ownership did not reappear, apparently because 
the “old wealth” of the prewar period had been destroyed by the reforms. 
  The efficiency argument is less likely to explain the reinforcement of cross-
shareholding in the 1960s. Then, some fear of hostile takeovers was plausible as Japan 
opened to foreign capital. 
 
1.2 Who is a Group Member? 
Unlike the prewar zaibatsu, postwar groups in Japan have no central control, and 
identifying affiliation with a group is not straightforward. Core members typically take 
part in “presidents’ clubs,” which are regular meetings of senior executives. Members of 
these clubs are easy to identify, and constitute about 10% of all listed manufacturing 
firms in Japan (Weinstein and Yafeh 1995). 
  Beyond the presidents’ club, researchers have used a variety of measures to 
identify group members. Commonly used definitions are those of three major 
publications: Keizai Chosa Kyokai’s Keiretsu no Kenkyu, Toyo Keizai’s Kigyo Keiretsu 
Soran, and Dodwell Marketing Consultants’ Industrial Groupings in Japan. These 
weigh various aspects of the relationship between a firm and other group members, 
most notably the extent and stability of cross-shareholding arrangements, and the extent 
and stability of credit and equity relations maintained with the group’s main financial 
institutions. The frequency of personnel exchange appears to be a relatively less 
important component. 
  The existing weighting schemes (and the corresponding data sources) usually 
concur as far as the identification of core group members is concerned, but may differ 
considerably in defining the boundaries of groups. Thus, Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) 
find the correlation between the lists of members identified by different sources to be 
not very high although all commonly used definitions suggest that group affiliated 
companies constitute some 40% to 50% of all listed manufacturing firms. Gibson 
(1995), looking at bank-firm ties in the early 1990s without reference to groups, 
suggests that several plausible methods agree on the identity of the “main bank” of most 
companies, although his methodology is not designed for identifying members in bank-
centered groups. 
  While credit relationships within groups are fairly easy to interpret, the 
prevalence and significance of equity ties is more controversial. The extent of equity 
ties reported by different sources varies within the group definition used. Mitsubishi and 
Sumitomo presidents’ club member firms had around 25% of their equity held by other 
group firms in 1990, whereas the corresponding figures for other groups hover around 15% to 16% (Sheard 1997). Figures for non-presidents’ clubs firms are typically 
substantially lower. 
  Most of the equity ties within the groups involve the group’s financial 
institutions (banks and insurance companies). By contrast, equity ties between 
manufacturing firms are usually low (with equity stakes that are often less than 1%). 
The meaning of these ties, which are unusually stable in spite of their small size, has 
been harder to interpret (see Flath 1993, Miwa and Ramseyer 2001a, and further 
discussion below). 
  The empirical literature on Japan has often treated bank-firm relations and group 
affiliation as one and the same. To a great extent, this is because the available 
definitions of group affiliation focus on ties with the group’s main bank. Thus, a large 
number of empirical studies actually rely on group data to suggest that long term bank-
firm relationships may matter for corporate governance, mitigation of informational 
asymmetries between the firm and its financiers, and the resolution of financial distress. 
(On the Japanese main bank system, see Aoki and Patrick 1994, Hoshi and Kashyap 
2001, especially chapter 4). 
 
 
2.  Reasons for Groups to Exist 
 
The literature on corporate groups has so far not reached an agreement on the most 
important reasons for the ubiquity of groups around the world. This section therefore 
begins with an evaluation of “positive” explanations for the existence of groups 
(viewing them as efficient solutions to various market imperfections) and their 
relevance to Japan. It then proceeds to discuss “negative” views of corporate groups 
(such as political rent-seeking and expropriation of minority shareholders) and to 
examine their applicability to Japan. 
 
2.1 Reducing Transaction Costs 
Corporate groups may be important for reducing transaction costs associated with intra-
group trade. Applying this idea to Japan, Flath (1993) argues that cross-shareholding 
arrangements help reduce moral hazard risks among trading partners, thus facilitating 
transaction-specific investments. Yet empirical evidence in support of this argument is 
rather scarce (Flath provides some), and it appears that the volume of intra-group trade 
within the bank-centered groups is rather low. Sheard (1997) estimates average intra-
group sales at about 2% excluding the group’s general trading company, which account 
for another 6+%.  Odagiri (1992, p 182) reports that, in 1981 on average 20% of a group firm’s sales and 12% of its purchases were within-group transactions. 
  By contrast, intra-group trade and transaction-specific investments may be a 
major factor explaining the structure and performance of manufacturer-centered 
(vertical) groups, where joint development of new products and just-in-time supply of 
inputs are crucial. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that manufacturer-centered 
groups combine insurance and incentives in a way that is designed to reduce hold-up 
problems through long-term relations without full vertical integration (Kawasaki and 
MacMillan 1987, Asanuma 1989, Fujimoto 1999). 
 
2.2 Coordinating Investment 
Groups may facilitate major investments by providing a mechanism for coordination 
across firms and industries. They may therefore be of help in orchestrating a “big push.” 
Thus, Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) view the zaibatsu as an important component in 
prewar Japan’s ability to absorb foreign technology, which could be spread across group 
members. 
  Goto (1982) argues that the reason groups are observed in a market economy 
like Japan is their ability to coordinate R&D and new investments. A weaker 
formulation of this hypothesis is that groups share information about investment 
opportunities, even if group members carry out investment decisions independently. 
Although this is not impossible, this conjecture is hard to test empirically and has never 
been formally examined. 
  Systematic evidence on joint investments and R&D among members of Japan’s 
postwar groups is not available. There is little in the literature on inter-firm coordination 
in R&D and technology absorption to suggest that the bank-centered groups have 
played a particularly important role in this respect (although there is some evidence on 
the importance of vertical groups: see Branstetter 2000, Okada 2001). 
  Montalvo and Yafeh (1994) find that group-affiliated firms signed more 
licensing agreements to import foreign technology into Japan in the late 1970s. There 
are several possible interpretations for this result, however. It is possible that group-
affiliated firms enjoyed easy access to capital from financial institutions within the 
group. It is also possible that group firms signed more licensing contracts because they 
were less involved in independent R&D activity, perhaps as a result of pressure by the 
group’s main bank to adopt low-risk investment strategies. 
  Using survey data from the late 1990s, Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh (2002) note 
that venture capital funds in Japan often are owned by firms related to each other, as 
part of one of the groups or otherwise. They do not discuss the impact of this 
characteristic on fund performance.  
2.3 Substituting for Missing Institutions 
Khanna and Palepu (1999) suggest groups in India and other developing countries make 
up for missing institutions, such as those enforcing property rights, as well as markets 
for skilled labor, management, and capital. This, they argue, is a plausible explanation 
for the evidence of superior performance of group members in India and other emerging 
markets, especially when groups exceed a certain size (or diversification) threshold. 
  This extended suggestions in the early descriptive literature that groups made up 
most notably for imperfect capital markets (for example, Leff 1978). Perotti and Gelfer 
(2001) argue that Russian financial-industrial groups (FIGs) manage an internal capital 
market that may add value in the face of inefficient external capital markets in that 
country. In addition, there is some evidence that internal capital markets in the Korean 
jaebol create value (Chang and Hong 2000). 
  Applied to skilled labor and management, the missing-institution argument 
could perhaps be related to the zaibatsu, which trained a generation of prewar Japanese 
executives, but it is more difficult to apply it to the postwar experience, and it is not 
supported by in any Japan-specific study. 
  Applied to under-developed capital markets, the missing-institution argument is 
undermined by the absence of evidence indicating efficient allocation of capital within 
the Japanese corporate groups, whose growth rates and other measures of performance 
have not been superior to those of non-group firms. Nevertheless, some relations 
between the postwar corporate groups and certain aspects of capital markets (risk 
sharing and corporate governance) are discussed below. In addition, Hoshi, Kashyap, 
and Scharsfetin (1990, 1991), argue that investment decisions of group affiliated 
companies are less sensitive to their cash flow positions than investment decisions of 
non-group firms, and also that some unnecessary bankruptcies are prevented within the 
groups. This could be viewed as evidence that groups do make up for some deficiencies 
of imperfect capital markets in the allocation of capital. 
 
2.4 Providing Mutual Insurance 
One function of capital markets that has been associated with corporate groups is the 
provision of mutual insurance opportunities for member firms. This idea originates in 
the literature on Japanese groups, where several studies suggest that groups provide an 
organizational mechanism through which risks are shared. A theoretical formulation of 
this hypothesis by Aoki (1988) suggests that employees with firm-specific human 
capital cannot easily protect themselves against adverse shocks and therefore appreciate 
risk reduction through firm relations with other firms within a corporate group, and especially with the group’s main bank. 
  Nakatani (1984) provides empirical support for the claim that Japanese corporate 
groups provide a low-profit and low-volatility environment. Kashyap (1989) suggests 
that the low volatility of profits documented by Nakatani is a result of intra-group trade 
relations (and therefore is not a characteristic of final-good producers within the 
groups). 
  There is evidence on a particular form of risk sharing under the auspices of the 
main bank within the big-six groups, namely, assistance during financial distress. For 
example, Sheard (1989) documents a variety of cases in which banks rescued ailing 
clients, typically within their group and often with the assistance of other group 
members. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, chapter 5) discuss bank interventions. 
  Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that members of bank-centered Japanese 
groups adopt low-risk investment strategies, although the motivation for this behavior 
is, in their view, related not to risk sharing but to the (excessive) influence that the group 
bank and other creditors exert on group firms. Khanna and Yafeh (2001) conduct a 
battery of risk-sharing tests among corporate groups in Japan and elsewhere, and find 
consistent evidence for mutual insurance among member firms of Japanese (and 
Korean) corporate groups, in contrast with most of the other countries they examine. 
  Thus, while there is limited evidence on other possible economic roles of 
corporate groups in Japan, the risk-sharing hypothesis does enjoy some empirical 
support. Further, this mutual insurance feature seems to distinguish Japanese groups 
from most corporate groups in emerging markets. The sociological literature has also 
emphasized risk sharing within Japan’s corporate groups (for example, Lincoln et al 
1996). But, the evidence on risk sharing within corporate groups in Japan has not been 
unchallenged (see Beason 1998, Kang and Stulz 2000, and Miwa and Ramseyer 2001a, 
2001b). Further discussion on risk and return within groups is included below. 
 
2.5 Corporate Governance 
Another capital market function that has sometimes been associated with Japanese 
corporate groups is corporate governance. For example, group members are viewed as 
important in the theoretical corporate governance model of Berglof and Perotti (1994). 
Yet, overall, empirical support for the special role of groups in corporate governance 
appears to be limited. There is much evidence on the role of main banks, typically 
within corporate groups, in disciplining managers of distressed firms, and in 
restructuring their operations (Yafeh 2000, Hoshi and Kashyap 2001). There is also 
some evidence on the role of large shareholders (often part of the group) in corporate 
governance, again mostly with respect to poorly performing companies (Kang and Shivdasani 1995, 1997). Yafeh and Yosha (2002) provide some evidence for the role of 
large shareholders in corporate governance in companies whose performance is normal. 
There is very little to suggest that corporate groups contribute to corporate governance 
beyond the roles played by the group banks and by large shareholders (although it is 
perhaps possible to argue that the group provides a framework in which main banks and 
large shareholders operate). 
 
2.6 Monopoly Power 
The fear that groups with “deep pockets” may drive more focused (smaller) competitors 
out of the market is not new, and was one of the motivations for the American 
occupation authorities’ drive to dissolve the zaibatsu (Yafeh 1995). While groups in 
some countries (for example, Korea) do appear to dominate markets, the general 
evidence on the relation between market power and corporate groups is weak. Encaoua 
and Jacquemin (1982) find little evidence of monopolization by French groups. 
Lawrence (1993) argues that Japanese groups constitute a barrier to entry because they 
prefer to purchase inputs from other group members, and thus restrict competition by 
foreign firms. The evidence on the limited extent of intra-group trade is inconsistent 
with this argument and, moreover, Lawrence’s empirical evidence in support of this 
argument is not fully convincing (Saxonhouse 1993). 
  Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) use an industrial organization framework to 
examine the relation between the intensity of competition and the market share of 
Japanese bank-centered groups. They suggest that, if anything, group members tend to 
compete more aggressively than other firms; although fierce competition may well 
constitute a barrier to entry, there is no evidence of collusion among group members at 
the expense of “outsiders.” 
 
2.7 Political Rent Seeking 
As in prewar Japan, the origins of corporate groups and their initial growth in many 
countries were influenced by close ties with the government. The zaibatsu emerged in 
the 1880s as part of the Matsukata privatization of government-owned assets and 
expanded to a large extent through government contracts and procurement. Groups in 
India emerged after independence when businessman with government ties acquired 
assets that had belonged to the British. In Korea the jaebol were formed under the 
auspices of the government and started off by using assets left at the end of the Japanese 
colonial period. Such close government ties have prompted accusations that corporate 
groups derive benefits from rent seeking and government favors, and are therefore 
inefficient. Fisman (2001) finds explicit evidence for this in Indonesia.   There are no studies linking postwar Japanese groups with corruption or specific 
government favors and contracts. Industrial policy was notoriously conducted at the 
industry level and no firm-specific subsidies were given (Johnson 1982). Corruption 
scandals have not involved group-affiliated firms more than other corporations, and 
corporate groups have never been mentioned as part of any political party’s 
constituency. (For the ruling LDP, these traditionally are thought of as being farmers, 
small shop owners, and perhaps the construction industry). 
  One measure of government-business ties in Japan is the practice of amakudari, 
the transfer of bureaucrats from the government to the private sector. van Rixtel (2002) 
finds that firms within corporate groups are less likely to receive amakudari than other 
firms. 
 
2.8 Expropriation of Minority Shareholders 
A growing literature has blamed corporate groups with the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Claessens et al. (1999) argue that groups are associated with minority 
shareholder expropriation in Asia. Similarly, Johnson et al. (2000), as well as Bertrand 
et al. (2002) view groups as institutions that are associated with poor protection of 
property rights and enable “tunneling” of funds from minority shareholder to the 
controlling party. This argument is unlikely to be particularly relevant to Japan, most 
notably because Japanese groups do not have a controlling shareholder, and also 
because, according to the commonly used La Porta et al. (1998) classification, the legal 
protection of minority shareholders in Japan is, by international standards, not bad. 
Even though some cases in which unhappy Japanese shareholders sued corrupt 
corporations have been reported in the press, there is little systematic evidence to 





Much has been written on Japan’s corporate groups, and yet concrete evidence (positive 
or negative) on their economic importance is surprisingly scarce. Only the groups’ role 
in mutual risk sharing has received some empirical support. In addition, there is much 
evidence that large shareholders (often within a corporate group), and main bank 
                                                             
2 Ando, Christelis, and Miyagawa (2002) observe that Japanese shareholders are in a weak position 
relative to management, which, they argue, has been able to pursue non-profit maximization objectives. 
The concern here is in the spirit of the “tunneling” literature (Johnson et al. 2000), focusing on how 
insider, usually majority, shareholders treat other shareholders, especially within corporate groups. 
According to the standard measures of statutory legal protection used in the recent finance literature, 
Japanese minority shareholders enjoy many of the legal protection measures of common law countries. relationships (also typically within a corporate group) are often important for corporate 
governance, although there is little to suggest the importance of the group structure per 
se. It is therefore possible to conclude that the limited evidence on Japan’s corporate 
groups is (weakly) consistent with the positive views of corporate groups as substitutes 
for missing (capital market and other) institutions.  
 
 
3.  Comparing Groups in Japan and Elsewhere 
 
This section compares Japan’s corporate groups with groups in other countries. They, of 
course, may differ substantially in structure and mode of operation but, at the same 
time, have many common features (most notably cross shareholding). The main thrust 
of the comparison is that Japanese groups are not unique in structure, but are perhaps 
“special” in their (low) risk and (low) return characteristics. Because of data constraints, 
and perhaps also because groups are less common in developed economies, most of the 
countries included in this comparison are “emerging markets,” although some 
comparisons will be made with Italian groups.  
 
3.1 A First Look 
Table 1 describes corporate groups in Japan and in a several emerging markets. The 
fraction of firms classified as group affiliated ranges from about a fifth in Chile and 
Venezuela to about two-thirds in Indonesia. In Italy more than half of all industrial 
companies belong to pyramidal groups (Bianchi et al. 2001). In Japan, members of 
presidents’ clubs account for fewer than 10% of listed manufacturing firms, whereas 
other group definitions (for example, those of Dodwell Marketing Consultants and 
Keiretsu no Kenyu) identify close to a half of all listed manufacturing firms as members. 
Thus, in terms of overall prevalence groups, Japan does not seem to be different. 
  Table 1 also indicates that in Japan, as well as in virtually all the other countries 
for which data are available (Turkey being the only exception), group affiliated firms 
are larger than unaffiliated firms. Difference in median size between presidents’ clubs 
members and other firms are somewhat bigger than differences in means - the mean size 
of presidents’ clubs members is about seven times that of non-members. The mean size 
of firms that are classified as group affiliated by Dodwell is about 50% larger than the 
size of unaffiliated firms. 
  This pattern is very pronounced in Italy as well, where large firms are 
predominantly group affiliated: over 99% of firms with over 1000 employees are group 
members, as are about 89% of the firms with 500-1000 employees. By contrast, less than 40% of small firms (fewer than 100 employees) are group members (Bianchi et al. 
2001). 
 
3.2 Group Organization and Location across Industries 
Japan’s postwar corporate groups are different from groups in many other countries in 
the conspicuous absence of a centralized decision-making mechanism. Without holding 
companies (legally banned between the end of World War II and 1998) or other formal 
joint control mechanism, it is hard to expect groups to coordinate their activities very 
extensively. This is in sharp contrast with Italian groups, where an elaborate pyramid 
structure guarantees centralized control; indeed, Bianchi et al. (2001) argue that the very 
reason for the prevalence of groups in Italy is to generate a wedge between control and 
cash flow rights. 
  Although the degree of cohesiveness of groups varies across countries and 
across groups, in many emerging markets, including Korea, groups seem to be far more 
centrally controlled than they are in Japan. Thus, the “loose” structure of Japan’s 
postwar groups appears to be distinctly different than the structure of groups in many 
emerging markets (and also in sharp contrast with the prewar period). 
  The spread of groups across manufacturing industries is displayed in Table 2. 
(There are insufficient data to include services). Perhaps the most notable pattern is the 
absence of a clear pattern of group location across industries, although there is some 
evidence that groups in several countries tend to locate in somewhat more capital-
intensive industries. This pattern is reminiscent of the zaibatsu in prewar Japan, 
although it is far from universally true. 
  Postwar Japanese group firms seem to be evenly spread across many sectors (the 
so called “one-set policy”). This pattern is not unique to Japan; for example Chilean 
groups also seem to exhibit this tendency, although their structure appears to be less 
“complete” than that of the Japanese groups. In terms of sales, relatively more capital-
intensive sectors such as metals and chemicals seem to be particularly important for 
Japan’s corporate groups in terms of both the fraction of total group assets and group 
firms’ market shares. These sectors are generally important for the Japanese economy as 
a whole, so this finding is hardly surprising. 
  The importance of services, most notably financial services, varies tremendously 
among groups in different countries. Whereas in some countries groups’ entry into the 
financial services industry has been restricted (for example, Korea), in other countries 
services constitute the bulk of group activity. Thus, it appears that, aside from the loose 
control, the structure and organization of Japan’s corporate groups is not unique. 
 3.3 Risk and Return 
Table 3 displays simple profit rates and profit volatility statistics for group and non-
group member firms in Japan and elsewhere. In 6 of 12 countries in the table, profit 
rates and profit volatility are lower for group affiliated firms, though not always in a 
statistically significant manner. 
  Japanese corporate groups are among those characterized by low risk and low 
profitability, although differences in medians appear to be small and not statistically 
significant. Differences in mean profitability (3.7% for members of presidents’ clubs 
versus 4.0% for other firms) are also statistically insignificant, although differences in 
mean standard deviation of profitability are statistically significant (standard deviation 
of operating profitability of 2.4 for Presidents’ Clubs members versus 2.9 for other 
firms). Using the Dodwell definition, group firms exhibit significantly lower mean 
profitability, as well as significantly lower mean and median standard deviation of 
profitability relative to other firms. 
  The characterization of the Japanese groups as providing a low-risk and low-
return environment is borne out in more sophisticated econometric tests of the mutual 
insurance hypothesis conducted in Khanna and Yafeh (2001). They report that Japanese 
corporate groups (members of presidents’ clubs) seem to provide mutual insurance for 
members firms according to five of the six tests they conducted.
3 
  This is hardly true for most groups around the world: although groups in Korea 
and a few other countries also seem to provide a low-risk environment according to 
these tests, groups in most emerging markets do not. Further, there seems to be little 
relation between the extent of development of a country’s financial system and the 
extent of mutual insurance provided by groups. In Japan too, there is little difference 
                                                             
3 There are six tests. 1) A benchmark OLS regression where the standard deviation of operating 
profitability is regressed on a number of control variables and a group affiliation dummy. 2) A test of the 
relation between the squared residuals from a regression with profitability as a dependent variable, and a 
group affiliation dummy. 3) Tests of first order stochastic dominance comparing the distributions of profit 
volatility among group affiliated and non-affiliated firms. 4) A test comparing whether the distribution of 
profitability among group firms is more skew than among non-group firms because groups bail out 
member firms in financial distress and should therefore include fewer poorly performing members.  5) A 
test derived from Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) of the extent to which shocks to profitability are 
smoothed through changes in dividends received. 6) A two-dimensional stochastic dominance test of the 
hypothesis that group affiliated firms exhibit both low profitability and low profit volatility relative to 
non-group firms. For Japanese groups, evidence of risk sharing (low profit volatility) was found in all of 
the tests except the last. between measures of mutual insurance within corporate groups before and after the 
liberalization of Japan’s financial markets in the 1980s. 
  The simple profitability statistics reported in Table 3 suggest that in many cases 
group-affiliated firms outperform their unaffiliated counterparts. More detailed 
econometric studies (controlling for various firm and group characteristics) also confirm 
that group membership is often associated with superior performance. (See Chang and 
Choi 1988 for Korea; Keister 1998 for China; Khanna and Palepu 1999 and 2000 for 
Chile and India.) 
  By contrast, the raw figures for Japan, suggesting lower profit rates for group 
affiliated firms, are confirmed by a long list of empirical studies. Caves and Uekusa 
(1976), Nakatani (1984), Odagiri (1992), Weinstein and Yafeh (1995, 1998), and Kang 
and Shivdasani (1999) all find that members of bank-centered Japanese groups under-
perform otherwise comparable unaffiliated firms. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) also point 
out that growth rates among group affiliated companies were never higher than growth 
rates of corresponding unaffiliated companies. 
  A plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that Japanese group firms do 
something other than profit maximization, perhaps in accordance with the interests of 
influential creditors (banks) within the group. We conclude that, in terms of risk and 
return trade-offs, Japanese corporate groups appear to differ from most of the corporate 
groups elsewhere. 
  For further discussion of the reasons for low profit rates among group firms see 
Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, p 200-03). Okazaki (2001) finds that in the prewar period 
firms affiliated with zaibatsu exhibited higher profit rates than comparable unaffiliated 
firms, in contrast to the postwar period. 
 
 
4. Long-term Changes and Prospects 
 
This section begins with an evaluation of the impact of corporate groups on the 
development of the Japanese economy in the long run. It then proceeds to a discussion 
of the evolution of the groups over time, continues to discuss the relative performance 
of group members in the 1990s, and concludes with an examination of the weakening of 
cross-shareholding and banking ties. 
 
4.1 Long-Run Development of Industries 
One (admittedly rough) way to evaluate the impact of corporate groups on the 
development of industries is to compare the growth rates of industries in Japan and the United States, and to relate the differences to group presence. Using industry-level 
growth rates (drawn from Carlin and Mayer 1999), Table 4 displays the fastest growing 
and declining industries in the United States and Japan for the period 1970-95. 
  In terms of capital formation, the same industries lead the list in both countries; 
in terms of growth of value added, there are some differences. Declining industries in 
the two countries also are quite similar. For the purpose of the present discussion, there 
is nothing to suggest that the growth rates of Japanese industries where group presence 
is more pronounced are substantially different than in the United States. Note that it is 
difficult to calculate the correlation between industry growth and group market share 
because the industry definitions Carlin and Mayer used are somewhat different than the 
2-digit SIC used in Table 2.  
 
4.2 Industry Location 
Group affiliation data drawn from the 1994 Keiretsu no Kenkyu suggest that group 
members were spread across many sectors, with their presence more pronounced in the 
chemicals, machinery, and electronics industries, much as in earlier periods. The 
differences in size between group and non-group firms documented earlier seem to have 
persisted into the 1990s, and, much as in earlier periods, group firms are still somewhat 
more leveraged (Table 5). There is no reason to believe groups have re-organized so as 
to focus more on certain industries, and there is little evidence that the structure of 
Japan’s corporate groups has changed significantly in other ways, at least until the mid 
1990s.  
 
4.3 Performance in the 1990s 
Table 5 suggests that small differences in ROA are still present in the 1990s, with 
group-affiliated companies being somewhat less profitable than unaffiliated firms. The 
table also suggests that the characterization of group members as less volatile appears to 
hold for the 1990s as well.  
  Differences in profitability between group members and unaffiliated firms are 
clearly observed in the multivariate regressions displayed in Table 6. It is also 
interesting to note that while the average group-affiliated company experienced 
(nominal) asset growth of about 10% between 1991 and 2000, the assets of non-group 
companies grew, on average, at about 17% during the same period. Thus, risk and return 
differences between group members and other companies seem to hold in the 1990s as 
well. 
  To the extent that performance differences in earlier years were due to bank 
monopoly power, leading to non-profit-maximization among group firms (see Weinstein and Yafeh 1998), the evidence from the 1990s may attest to continued influence of 
banks on remaining clients, despite on-going liberalization. Low profitability of group 
members as a result of low risk strategies may still explain some of the differences in 
the 1990s, as the low volatility of profits suggests. The banking crisis may have had a 
negative effect on firms with ties to ailing banks and is another possible explanation for 
these findings (see Kang and Stulz 2000). Finally, it is quite possible that some of the 
relatively poor performance of group members in the 1990s is due to the phenomenon 
of good firms ending their long-term ties with their main bank, and possibly with their 




The on-going recession in Japan and the decline in share prices may have made cross-
shareholding arrangements costly to maintain and the weakness of the group’s main 
banks may have also contributed to the disintegration of the groups. At the same time, it 
is possible to argue that mutual risk-sharing arrangements within the groups are 
particularly valuable in the present economic conditions. 
  Suzuki (1998) reports that the sale of equity stakes held by corporations for long 
periods of time had not been a widespread phenomenon at the time he conducted his 
research. However, Okabe (2001) shows that substantial divestment of shares has been 
going on within the corporate groups since the late 1990s, especially by non-financial 
corporations. His main finding is that non-financial corporations have reduced cross-
shareholding ties with financial institutions substantially, whereas other forms of cross 
shareholding within groups (among financial institutions, between financial institutions 
and non-financial corporations, and among non-financial corporations) have remained 
virtually unchanged. For example, shares held by financial institutions as part of cross-
shareholding arrangements remained roughly unchanged between 1987 and 1997, and 
then declined from about 8% of all shares to 6% in 1999. This reflects a decrease of 
similar magnitude in shareholding by financial institutions in both financial and non-
financial companies. By contrast, shareholding by non-financial corporations declined 
somewhat in the early 1990s and then, during 1995-99, declined from about 9% of total 
market value to 4.5%. This is accounted for primarily by a 4.1 percentage-point fall in 
shares held by corporations in financial institutions (Okabe 2001, Table 2). A Nippon 
Life Insurance (2001) study, which is the source of Okabe’s figures, confirms more 
broadly that the reduction in cross shareholding is a phenomenon of the second half of 
the 1990s, and that it is common to all major corporate groups. Some data are in Table 
7.   In spite of these trends, comparisons of membership in presidents’ clubs show 
little evidence of group disintegration between 1989 and 1999. It is important to note 
also that these figures are somewhat sensitive to the definition of group affiliation and 
cross- or stable shareholding ties.  
 
4.5 Banking Ties and Mergers 
The trend of decreasing cross shareholding ratios, especially between non-financial 
corporations and banks, is likely to be exacerbated by firms deciding to discontinue 
their long-term relations with the group’s main banks. There is now no doubt that this 
phenomenon, which was documented initially by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 
(1993), and more recently in Anderson and Makhija (1999) and in Miyajima and 
Arikawa (2001), is of large magnitude.  
  The merger wave among financial institutions that cuts across traditional group 
lines is another factor that is likely to destabilize the existing group structure. For 
example, mergers between DKB and Fuji banks (together with the Industrial Bank of 
Japan), and between Sakura (Mitsui) and Sumitomo banks, could potentially lead to 
mergers of their clients firms. An early 2002 example of this is the merger talks between 
the marine and fire insurance companies of the Mitsui and Sumitomo groups. Mitsui 
Chemical and Sumitomo Chemical merged in 1998, and NKK, part of the Fuji group, 
formed a strategic alliance with Kawasaki Steel of the DKB group. It will certainly alter 
the previous situation in which no group contains two competing firms, and no bank 
serves as main bank to competing companies. 
 
4.6 Summary 
It is clear that Japan’s corporate groups have been changing, and that the bank-firm 
(equity and debt) ties which were at their core, have been substantially weakened. One 
telling indicator of a declining importance of groups is the cessation of publication of 
two main data sources on groups (Keiretsu no Kenkyu ceased publication in 1998 and 
Kigyo Keiretsu Soran in 2000). This decline in corporate groups appears to be 
associated with a general move towards a more market-based financial system in Japan 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 1999) and may even have contributed to the decline in Japanese 
stock prices. Yet it would be ridiculous to argue that the miserable stock returns are 
simply due to dumping of shares formerly held within corporate groups. The unwinding 
of cross shareholdings should contribute to market liquidity, although this effect is hard 
to assess given the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. 
  A decrease in stable shareholding within corporate groups is likely to increase 





Corporate groups in Japan are undergoing significant change reflected in declining cross 
shareholding, as well as in weakened main bank relationships. The consolidation of 
banks across groups is likely to accelerate this trend, making former main bank 
relationships obsolete. If groups were ever an impediment to structural change, perhaps 
most notably as hindrances to hostile takeovers and market-based corporate governance, 
they are unlikely to constitute a major obstacle in the future.
4 
  For all the attention Japanese groups attracted in the last third of the 20th 
century, not much is going to be missed from their demise, at least in terms of the 
economic roles they played.  Even the mutual insurance provided within corporate 
groups is likely to decline in importance, as firm-specific human capital will lose some 
of its value and financial markets become ever more developed. 
  Similarly, the corporate governance roles allegedly played by large shareholders 
and financial institutions within the corporate groups are likely to be replaced by new, 
perhaps more market-oriented mechanisms, guaranteeing the efficient operations of 
firms. Thus, limited economic importance, combined with little political clout, suggest 
that Japan’s corporate groups are unlikely to constitute an impediment to future changes 
in financial markets and corporate strategy. 
  Despite the large literature on corporate groups in Japan and elsewhere, the 
phenomenon of business groups still has many unanswered questions. Why is it that 
groups are observed in so many countries in early stages of their economic 
development? What is the most important reason for their existence? Why is the mutual 
insurance function of groups more important in Japan and a few other countries than in 
most emerging markets? How do groups evolve over time, and does their development 
pattern provide any evidence on their raison d’être? Will the Japanese groups provide 
the first example of groups that end their lives peacefully, or will government 
intervention be needed? These are only some of the questions on corporate groups that 
await further research. 
                                                             
4 Peek and Rosengren (2002) express a different view, arguing that loans by financial institutions within 
groups impede “creative destruction” by prolonging the life of weak corporate borrowers. Although long-
term bank-firm relations may prevent some bankruptcies of firms that are no longer viable, it is not clear 
that corporate groups substantially exacerbate this tendency. References 
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2  Country and period 
44 5.5  Argentina  1990-97 
47 2.5  Brazil  1990-97 
22 18.7  Chile  1989-96 
33 4.4  India  1990-97 
65 2.8  Indonesia  1993-95 
23 5.0  Israel  1993-95 
>50  ..a  Italy early 1990s 
51 3.9  Korea  1991-95 
35 2.3  Mexico  1988-97 
25 3.4  Philippines  1992-97 
44 2.0  Taiwan  1990-97 
62 2.3  Thailand  1992-97 
52 1.0  Turkey  1988-97 
    
29  6.8  Prewar Japan (largest three groups) 1932-43 
9  8.5  Postwar Japan (Presidents’ Clubs) 1977-92 
39  2  Postwar Japan (Dodwell definition) 1977-92 
 
1  Percentage of firms affiliated with groups. 
2  Median size of group-affiliated firms divided by median size of unaffiliated firms. 
a  Group firms are much larger. 
 






Group Location across Manufacturing Industries 
Country 
The groups’ most important 
industries 
Industries in which group 
market share is largest 
Argentina  Oil refining and natural resource 
extraction, metals. 
Oil refining and natural 
resource extraction, textiles, 
metals. 
Brazil  Chemicals, Oil refining and natural 
resource extraction; metals. 
Food, lumber and wood, 
metals 
Chile  Firms spread across sectors, (lumber 
and wood important). 
Food and tobacco, lumber and 
wood, rubber and plastic. 
Indonesia  Firms spread across sectors, lumber 
and wood, construction, 
transportation equipment important 
Construction, machinery, 
transportation equipment 
Israel  Metals, Electronics, chemicals  Metals, Electronics, chemicals 
Korea  Machinery, metals, transportation 
equipment 
Oil refining and natural 
resource extraction, 
transportation equipment, 
rubber, many sectors. 
Mexico  Food and tobacco, mining  Food and tobacco, 
construction, textile, mining. 
Philippines  Food and tobacco, oil refining and 
natural resource extraction. 
Food and tobacco, lumber and 
wood. 
Taiwan  Machinery, textile, chemicals.  Misc., oil refining and natural 
resource extraction, lumber 
and wood.  
Thailand  Firms spread across sectors  Metals, oil refining and natural 
resource extraction, chemicals. 
Turkey  Firms spread across sectors  Construction, food and 
tobacco, chemicals. 
Prewar Japan  Heavy Industry (Hadley, 1970)  Heavy Industry (Hadley, 1970) 
Postwar Japan 
(1987) 
One set policy - firms evenly spread 
across sectors; a bit more weight in 




The sample periods, division between group and non-group firms, and sources are the 












-3.9** -1.2**  Argentina 
1.5** -1.0  Brazil 
3.7* 0.3  Chile 
2.1* 0.2*  India 
-0.5 -0.6*  Indonesia 
2.4* -0.5 Israel 
-0.3 -0.7*  Korea 
2.1 0.5  Mexico 
3.3 -0.4  Philippines 
-1.1 -0.6**  Taiwan 
-1.5* -0.6**  Thailand 
-1.7 -2.9  Turkey 
-0.9  -2.7  Prewar Japan (three largest zaibatsu) 
-0.2 -0.1  Postwar  Japan (Presidents’ Clubs) 
-0.2  -0.2*  Postwar Japan (Dodwell) 
 
  Data are for the year of maximal coverage for each country (for Japan, 1987 
profitability, and standard deviation based on 1977-92), and excludes firms with profit 
rates above 100 percent or below -100 percent. 
1  Difference in median ROA between group and non-group firms. 
2  Difference in median of standard deviation of ROA between group and non-group 
firms 
  Significance levels for the comparisons of medians are based on Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests. Significance at the 5% level is denoted by *; at the 10% level by **. 
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Chemicals (non industrial) 
Chemicals (industrial)   
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Corporate Groups, 1991-2000 
Group 
firms 








4150  -  2883 -  Number of observations
2 
287*  566  191  494  Total assets (billion yen) 
0.57* 0.17 0.54  0.26 Debt/assets 
3.8* 3.5 4.0  4.5 ROA  (%) 
2.0*  1.2  2.4  1.5  Standard deviation of ROA (%)
3 
3.0  3.3  3.2  4.6  Operating profit as % assets 
2.9  3.5  3.1  5.4  Ordinary profit as % assets
4 
 
  Group affiliation is based on the 1994 Keiretsu no Kenkyu definition. Note that 
the percentage of group-affiliated companies in this sample is somewhat higher than in 
earlier studies. 
  Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by *. 
1 Standard  deviation. 
2  Total number of observations over the entire period. 
3  Mean (within firm) standard deviation of ROA. 
4  Ordinary profit is total profit (operating and other income, including capital gains, 












-0.38* (0.09)  -0.30*  (0.08)  -0.24*  (0.09)  Group  dummy 
-5.75* (0.51)  -6.19*  (0.35)  -10.37*  (1.48)  Debt/assets 
-5.64* (0.39)  -5.35*  (0.40)  -6.62*  (0.40)  Fixed  assets/total 
assets 
0.56* (0.06)  0.57*  (0.06)  0.69*  (0.10) Log  (sales) 
-0.14*  (0.06)  -0.24*  (0.06)  -0.24*  (0.07)  Standard deviation of 
ROA 
            
            Percentage of shares 
held by: 
0.011 (0.004) 0.015*  (0.005)  0.017*  (0.005) Top-12  shareholders 
0.05* (0.01)  0.03*  (0.01)  0.02*  (0.01) Individuals 
0.004 (0.005)  0.002  (0.004)  0.004  (0.006) Financial  institutions 
-0.09* (0.03)  -0.06  (0.03)  -0.09  (0.04)  Non-financial  firms 
            
0.29 -  0.28  -  0.41  - R
2 
 
The dependent variables are measures of profitability and the regressions are OLS using 
pooled data with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors reported in parentheses. 
The group affiliation dummy equals one for firms that are classified as group members 
using the 1994 Keiretsu no Kenkyu definition. In all three cases N is 7033, and year 
dummies and industry dummies are used. 




Trends in Cross Shareholding of Major Groups 
 
Average percentage of shares of a member firm cross-held by other group firms.
1 










14.8 14.0 11.3  -19.3  Mitsubishi 
13.4 11.3  8.9  -21.3  Sumitomo 
10.2 7.6  5.1  -32.9  Mitsui 
11.2 7.7  4.6  -40.3  Fuji 
9.1 7.9 6.2  -21.5 Dai-Ichi  Kangyo 
(DKB) 
9.3 7.3 4.9  -32.9 Sanwa 
 
1  The figures refer to cross-shareholding only, as identified by NLI, as opposed to all 
“stable” shareholding within the group. 
2  Percentage change in cross shareholding from 1997 to 2000. 
3  Group firms as identified by NLI.  
 
Source:  NLI (2001), Table 5 
 